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RESPONSE
EVIDENCE IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: SOME THOUGHTS ON
PROFESSOR JONAKAIT'S CRITIQUE OF A FEMINIST
APPROACH
AVIVA ORENSTEIN*
Professor Jonakait and I disagree about the relationship
between evidence law and culture. Even assuming that Professor
Jonakait's black-letter characterizations are entirely correct, the
question remains: how do we understand the excited utterance
exception, however neutrally it is framed?
In my article I applied feminist scholarship to analyze how
gendered notions of truth and credibility might influence evidence
law.' I examined the hold the excited utterance exception has on
our cultural imaginations and questioned how it reflects general

* J.D. 1986 Cornell Law School. Associate Professor Indiana University'School of Law
- Bloomington. Thanks to Professors Kathryn Abrams, Katherine Baker, Hannah
Buxbaum, Fred Cate, Roger Dworkin, Charlie Geyh, Lynne Henderson, Steve Johnson, Seth
Lahn,David Leonard, Roger Park, Bill Popkin, Myrna Raeder, Lauren Robel, Eileen Scallen,

Gene Shreve, Eleanor Swift, Susan Williams, and Emily Van Tassel, for their comments on
early drafts of this response.
1. Specifically, I argued that the criteria of the excited utterance, though they may
reflect the experience of some speakers, are at odds with the practical experience of rape
victims, who often do not make prompt, excited declarations. Although the excited utterance
exception may reflect the sincere responses of some speakers, it is underinclusive. Therefore,
I proposed an additional exception for rape survivors. See Aviva Orenstein, "MY GOD!: A
Feminist Critiqueof the Excited Utterance ExceptiOn to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159
(1997).
Professor Jonakait objects to my use of Rape Trauma Syndrome, arguing that I did
not demonstrate that victims tend to be calm or to delay reporting, and that those who do are
more reliable. Courts and commentators, however, regularly cite Rape Trauma Syndrome
to explain delay and calm demeanor. See, e.g., People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 952 (Colo.
1987) (allowing the use of Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence to aid the jury in determining
what effect should be given to the victim's delay in reporting the rape); People v. Taylor, 552
N.E.2d 131, 138 (N.Y. 1990) (admitting Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence to explain victim's
subdued demeanor following the attack); Lynn H. Schafran, Women in the CriminalJustice
System: Writing and Reading about Rape: A Primer,66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 1014 (1993);
Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome
Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 429
(1985). It is not necessary to postulate that calm, delayed reports are always superior, but
only that they are at least as valid as excited utterances. Such calm delayed reports are
typical of many rape victims (most of whom never pursue legal remedies) and reflect a style
of communication disfavored by the evidence rules. See infra note 21 and accompanying text
(disputing the notion that either delayed or immediate reports are reliable, but both cannot
be).
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notions of credibility.2 At bottom, Professor Jonakait seems to
believe that such inquires are not only misguided, but illegitimate.
As an initial matter, we disagree about three basic evidence
questions. First, Professor Jonakait argues that hearsay is about
the right to cross examine and not about reliability.' The reasons
behind hearsay are complex,4 but traditional analysis has always
focused on reliability as a chief rationale.5 Most significantly,
hearsay exceptions are largely explained by various theories of
reliability.6 Indeed, Professor Jonakait himself cannot escape
explaining hearsay exceptions in terms of reliability: 'WVhen the
hearsay concerns are reduced, the chances that a particular assertion is reliable is greater than for hearsay generally."7
Second, Professor Jonakait argues that the excited utterance
doctrine "says nothing about the declarants' general credibility,"'
and that, generally, hearsay law evaluates assertions, not
declarants. 9 Assertions, however, are not disembodied words; they
2. Professor Jonakait seems careful to distance himself from the rationale of the excited
utterance exception. See, e.g., Randolph Jonakait, "My God!" Is This How a Feminist Analyzes Excited Utterances?4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN L. 263, 269-70 (1998) ("Statements qualifying as excited utterances are at least theoretically thought to be more reliable than hearsay
generally.') (emphasis added). Many commentators have indeed questioned the wisdom of
the excited utterance exception. See, e.g., David P. Leonard, Perspectiveon ProposedFederal
Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Federal Rules of Evidence and the PoliticalProcess, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 315 (1995) (discussing the questionable psychology of the excited
utterance); James D. Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy of Res Gestae
Reliability, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 203, 203 (1995) ("Would you entrust your life to the judgment
or perception of a person who is acting under extreme stress or trauma?"). Professor
Jonakait's goal is not to provide a spirited defense of the excited utterance, but rather to
demonstrate the illegitimacy of my feminist approach.
3. Jonakait, supranote 2, at 265.
4. Cf. Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 384 (1992) (agreeing that "cross-examination alone as the
basis for insisting on live testimony and excluding hearsay is... reductionist.") (citing Roger
Park, A Subject MatterApproach to HearsayReform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 77 (1987)).
5. Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2017 (1996) ("Hearsay rules ... prohibit the
introduction of testimony which, though unquestionably relevant, is deemed insufficiently
reliable."); cf. Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 495, 497 (1987)
(noting and challenging the "essential premise" in the hearsay debate "that reliability is the
principal focus of the hearsay rule").
6. See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the
ConstitutionalUnavailabilityRequirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 683 ("Reliability has long
been viewed as the primary justification for recognizing exceptions to the hearsay rule")
(citations omitted). See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990) ("Admission under
a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability
because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing
the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements.") (citations omitted).
7. Jonakait, supra note 2, at 266.
8. Id.
9. See id. ("what is thought reliable is the assertion, not the declarant"). But cf., Roger
C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You': Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the
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are associated with declarants in particular situations. In deciding
the admissibility of the assertions we perforce draw conclusions
about the declarants' trustworthiness. One need not posit a conscious intent to denigrate to believe that our rules of evidence
express cultural preferences for some styles of communication over
others.' ° Furthermore, one need not see a hearsay declarant's
credibility as being impugned, but only in a specific context - such
as charges of rape. Even in traditional evidence jurisprudence, a
bright-line distinction between declarants' and assertions' reliability seems strained. A feminist analysis, concerned with context,
would be particularly skeptical of such an artificial and decontextualized approach. 1
Third, after acknowledging that raped women who are calm
after the attack may be disbelieved, Professor Jonakait asserts that
"[e]vidence law, however, does not cause this disbelief. Evidence
law admits or excludes evidence; it does not believe or disbelieve
witnesses."' 2 Although evidence law is not the sole cause of disbelief of women reporting rape, evidence law both reflects and perpetuates cultural biases that lead to disbelief of women.'" Such
biases include the expectation of outraged cries and the distrust of
delayed reports that are built into the excited utterance requirement.' 4 Unquestionably, evidence law is, as Professor Jonakait
asserts, a system for admitting and excluding evidence. But it is
also much more. Evidence law shapes and reflects who and what
are deemed credible. In essence, the rules of evidence direct acquisition of knowledge and describe our legal way of knowing things.'5
FederalRules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783, 784 (1990) (delineating a declarant-oriented
approach to hearsay and noting that "[h]earsay scholars tend to prefer the declarant
definition to the assertion definition .... ).
10. Cf. Kathy Mack, ContinuingBarriers to Women's Credibility: A Feminist Perspective
on the ProofProcess, 4 CRIM. L.F. 327, 330 (1993) ('The first element in the lack of belief in
women as witnesses has to do with general social expectations about how a credible speaker
is supposed to sound: like a man.").
11. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Genderingand EngenderingProcess,61 U. CIN. L. REV.
1223, 1231-32 (advocating use of feminist analysis to "explore a richer, more focused, complex
and contextual analysis of the role of process.').
12. Jonakait, supranote 2, at 268 (citations omitted).
13. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, PatriarchalStories I CulturalRape Narratives in
the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387 (1996).

14. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts,Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992) (describing cultural
stories that portray women who delay reporting rape as liars).
15. See Aviva Orenstein, Speech at the AALS Evidence Conference (Oct. 1996) (text on
file with office of William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law); cf. Michael L. Seigel, A
PragmaticCritique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1016-17 (1994)
(discussing the normative function of evidence law).
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At the heart of his argument, Professor Jonakait rejects the
feminist critique's skepticism of so-called neutral rules.1" Professor
Jonakait's faith in the neutrality of the excited utterance exception
is demonstrated by his rejection of the hypothesis that excited
utterances may discriminate against rape victims. He argues that
"[i]n reality, evidence law treats rape victims and their hearsay as
it treats others."17 In other words, once there is technically equal
treatment, there cannot be discrimination even if the rule in operation mirrors the communication style and expectations of the
dominant group. In forwarding this notion Professor
Jonakait
18
rejects a major premise of feminist jurisprudence.
We do not live in a tidy doctrinal world unruffled by culture
and unshadowed by nuance where truth is out there to be discovered.19 Therefore, the formal, often dualistic categories upon which
Professor Jonakait insists are not helpful. No impermeable
boundaries exist between the "substance" of rape law and evidentiary "procedure." Professor Jonakait, however, tries to draw such
bright lines. He divides "evidence law" from "societal attitudes,"
rarely stopping to ponder how they might influence one another. S°
Professor Jonakait insists on false dichotomies, implying, for instance, that if delayed rape reports are reliable, then immediate reports must not be, as if there were only one credible model against
16. Though Professor Jonakait has chosen to respond particularly to my piece, his
philosophical disagreements with a feminist critique of evidence address a growing scholarly
movement. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 430-52
(offering insights into how the evidence rules may ignore the experiences of women and
instead reflect male values and norms); Mack, supra note 10 (drawing on psychological
research and gender task force reports to analyze women's problems in gaining respect and
credibility in the courtroom); Rosemary Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms v.
Feminist Reform, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127 (1996) (exploring questions of credibility and
relevance, and arguing that women's stories must first be allowed into court, then they must
be taken seriously); Scheppele, supra note 14; Taslitz, supranote 13; Myrna S. Raeder, The
Admissibility of PriorActs of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1463 (1996).
17. Jonakait, supranote 2, at 271 (citation omitted).
18. See generally Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 63 (1993).
19. For instance, at a recent conference at Hastings College of Law entitled, 'Truth & Its
Rivals," many speakers addressed the post-modern question of whether there is a truth to
be uncovered by evidence law. See, e.g., Mirjan R. Dama~ka, Truth in Adjudication, Speech
at Hastings College of Law (Sept. 1997) (transcript on file with office of William & Mary
Journal of Women and the Law); see also David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not:
Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L. J. 1005,
1016 (arguing that "the 'truth' of a proposition can never be fully demonstrated"); Michael
L. Seigel, RationalizingHearsay: A Proposalfor a Best Evidence HearsayRule, 72 B.U. L.
Rev. 893, 896 (noting "the epistemological maxim that truth is not self-evident; we can do no
better than approximate it through the very processes we seek to evaluate').
20. Jonakait, supranote 2, at 270.
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which victims can be measured.2 1 Professor Jonakait distinguishes
"principles" from "politics"2 2 as if rape is somehow separate from
power,"3 and feminism is somehow separate from politics. Furthermore, evidence rules are not apolitical.2 4 The decision to read the
rules as neutral is itself a political choice.2" Professor Jonakait's
failure to realize this reflects a retro-epistemology that has been
largely eclipsed, even in evidence scholarship, which has been
notably cautious in incorporating new perspec-tives. 6
Professor Jonakait purports to be acting on behalf of feminism,
warning that if my analysis were "taken seriously," these principles
"could be particularly dangerous for feminism. 2 17
Professor
Jonakait, however, offers no affirmative definition of feminism or
alternate vision of what feminism could offer. s Aside from a brief
mention of use of experts,2 9 Professor Jonakait does not explain
how feminism can be rescued and properly applied to evidence
law.30

21. See id. at 273, 292. See Dawn M. DuBois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a
Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1087, 1105 ("women who are
raped or sexually abused do not always react in a uniform manner) (citations omitted); cf.
Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN L. 277, 280 (1993) ("The range
of 'credible' stories is narrower than the range of true ones.").
22. See Sheppele, supranote 4, at 166 (stating that the law "pretends to be above politics,
prejudice, and partiality").
23. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? MotivationalEvidence and Relevancy in
Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997).
24. Congress itself recognized political and substantive aspects of the evidence rules
when it refused to accept the Supreme Court's promulgation and insisted on treating them
as statutory.
25. See generally Eileen A. Scallen, ClassicalRhetoric, PracticalReasoning, and the Law
of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717 (1995).
26. See Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L. REV. 849, 849
(1991) ("The best-known interdisciplinary movements have, however, had little or no influence on evidence scholarship."); Seigel, supra note 15, at 995 ("the major intellectual movements characterizing legal thought during the latter quarter of the twentieth century...
have left evidence scholarship virtually untouched.").
27. Jonakait, supranote 2, at 263.
28. Professor Jonakait seems to deny any special problems arising out of rape, stating
that "[t]he victim can testify about the rape, just as I can testify about the damaged television
I received." Id. at 268. More provocatively, he states "Victims can find burglary stressful too,
as, I suspect, can those who find their checking accounts looted." Id. at 291. I reject the
implication that there is little different about rape. Such an assertion is clearly at odds with
a basic tenet of feminist theory and raises questions about what Professor Jonakait means
by feminism. See Coombs, supra note 21; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81
(1987).
29. See Jonakait, supra note 2, at 293-94.
30. At one point, however, Professor Jonakait exhorts feminists to be "careful," lest, for
instance, they inadvertently invite "[c]ourt-ordered psychiatric examination." Id.

300

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 4:295

Finally, Professor Jonakait's claim that my proposed survivor's
statement exception to hearsay "would accomplish almost
nothing"3 1 is curious given his extended critique. It is also mistaken. Professor Jonakait asserts that although admitting survivors' statements "may determine whether jurors hear about a delay
during direct examination or cross examination: [t]here is no reason
to think that how or when the jurors learn this information will
change their attitudes about the inferences to be drawn from the
delay itself."32 I am startled that he perceives no difference
between: (1) admitting a prior consistent statement for the truth of
the matter asserted in direct testimony to expand and fortify the
narrative; and (2) admitting that same out-of-court statement,
focusing not on its truth but on its timing, using the delay to
impeach the witness. The first allows the woman to tell her story
and to use additional sources to enrich the narrative and, within
the limitations of Rule 403, have repeated what she said to others.
It also permits the prosecution to draw any sting that a delayed
report might have, allowing the victim to explain the delay rather
than be confronted with it for the first time on cross examination.
The second does not include the specifics of the statement and
thereby screens out the voice and experience of the victim. It plays
into rape myths and serves to reinforce the preference for immediate report and obvious excitement, reminding the jurors of the
cultural presumption that "real" victims report immediately and act
visibly upset.
On this issue of jury perception, I think Professor Jonakait is
on to something. Rather than deem efforts to address individual
rules as pointless, however, I would characterize them as a first
step. Even if we address rule impediments to introducing delayed
stories, and jurors are therefore able to hear rape survivors'
delayed, calm reports, Professor Jonakait is quite right that jurors
may nevertheless remain suspicious. This problem does not inspire
me to abandon an attempt to rethink the rules. As courts begin to
admit survivors' prior statements, however, we must consider how
we can assist the jurors in overcoming their fondness for immediate
reports and rape myths.3 3

31. Id. at 269.
32. Id.

33. See Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men: A Feminist Analysis of CharacterEvidence in
Rape Trials,__ HASTINGS L. J. -

(forthcoming 1998) (opposing proposed Federal Rule of

Evidence 413 as unfair to defendants and instead advocating use of experts to educate the
jury about rape myths).
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Professor Jonakait's critique sounds an unmistakable note of
anxiety and agitation. Indeed, his piece reads like one extended
excited utterance, replete with the problems inherent in this genre
of communication. The startling event seems to be the application
of feminist jurisprudence to "neutral" evidence rules. Although his
critique seems spontaneous and sincere, its perception suffers from
limited perspective, and should not be taken for the truth of th
matter asserted.

